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Abstract: Intersection of patent and competition laws was discussed widely before. 
In fact, this issue is not regulated properly at the moment, but the activity of courts around 
the world made it possible to limit abusive patent practices which often lead to restriction of 
competition. However, new times raised new issues and to make the patent system relevant 
to needs of today legislators and judiciary have to pay attention to contemporary problems 
in patent law. This article is focused on recently revealed practices of patent management 
which could be dangerous for fair markets. 
 
1. Introduction 
The patent system was developed and implemented to protect results of intellectual work of an inventor 
and to reward him for his contribution to development of science and technology. In other words, the 
patent system serves for encouragement of innovation. In simple language the concept of that system 
could be described as an entitlement of an inventor with the right to prevent others from unauthorized 
usage of a patented invention for a period of time in response to disclosure of the invention for a public. 
And in that concept lies a key issue in balance between protection of intellectual property rights and 
protection of competition. 
However, such quality of patents is seen in positive way because innovative activity could make 
positions of existing monopoly power weaker and undermine them.1 
A patent could be very valuable asset of a company and in fact for high technology company patents 
create significant part of its value. Also because of the nature of patents they could be used as effective 
tools for gaining market power. And sometimes such activity could violate terms of anti-competitive 
legislation. 
There were some landmark cases before in which abuse of patent rights was admitted as 
contravention. For example, Hangards Inc. v Ethicon Inc. where Ethion Inc., which had filed series of 
infringement lawsuits against Hangards Inc., was recognized as being guilty for violation of antitrust 
legislation because patent litigation initiated by Ethion pursued an intention to monopolize an industry.2 
In Kobe Inc. v Dempsey Pump Co. court also emphasized unfair nature of litigation started by Kobe Inc. 
which was directed on creation of monopoly and awarded to the defendant antitrust damages as well as 
denied plaintiff’s allegations on infringement.3 However, there is an important thing in this case that Kobe 
Inc. had accumulated over 70 patents pertained to oil pumps. And when Dempsey Pump had introduced 
its own oil pump, Kobe Inc. approached it and its potential clients and indicated prospective lawsuits. 
Kobe Inc. threatened Dempsey Pump and its partners with a litigation and while threatening it used 
patents which were already expired and this fact was taken into account by the court. So in fact Kobe Inc. 
case includes both aspects of anti-competitive behavior as well as misrepresentation activity by using 
invalid patents. 
There is also another sample of abusive behavior which is related to the drugs market. Pharmaceutical 
companies often try to continue a period during which a patent still be valid by adding insufficient 
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indications to claims of existing patents and filing new patent applications.4 Such practice, however, has 
other sides: (1) claims become narrow and producers of generic drugs could avoid them and bring 
cheaper medicine to the market; (2) such producers could file a suit to repeal the patent on a basis of its 
obviousness, for example. To delay entering the market by generics pharmaceutical companies pay 
generic producers for refraining from market entering and patent litigation. As a result they save their 
dominant position.5 
All mentioned examples have one common aspect – in all cases patent holder had dominant position 
or tried to gain it and used own or acquired patents for this purpose. But, for instance, in most cases 
involved so-called “patent trolls” measures of anti-competitive law will be inefficient, because in such 
cases holder of patent rights does not try to exclude a competitor from a market but tries to get 
infringement damages or to force a potential infringer to enter into a license agreement.6 Moreover in 
such cases “troll” and his “target” are often even not rivals at all. 
Also, does a legislation can protect fair principles of trade when a patent holder does not try to 
exclude its competitors from a market and does not try to gain dominant position but create barriers for 
providing business under cover of patent rights? This issue concerns terms of legal protection from unfair 
trade practices rather than antimonopoly law. 
This article is an attempt to discover practices lie on the edge of competition law and patent law and 
concern influence of patent rights on competition. Also potential measures to limit abusive behavior are 
proposed. 
Most of practices covered by this article are related to IT industry because of increasing number of 
issued patents and contentions in this area. 
2. Patent infringement cases and aspects of competition 
American legal practice created two methods of counteraction against abusive behavior of patent holders: 
initiating the private anti-competitive case and patent misuse doctrine. 
First method was already indirectly described in the introduction, it based on landmark cases 
mentioned therein, especially on Hangards case. Usually a defendant alleged in patent infringement 
lodges a counterclaim where accuses the plaintiff in attempt to restrict or exclude competition by 
enforcement of his patent rights which presumed to be not infringed. In such type of cases the defendant 
must prove that the plaintiff tried to obtain monopoly power over a market by bringing an infringement 
suit; that probability of success of the plaintiff in obtaining monopoly power is high; and that such actions 
of the plaintiff caused damage to competition on a market. Of course, it is not the easiest mission, so most 
attempts to defend in patent infringement cases on a basis of antitrust legislation in the USA were 
unsuccessful. From existing analyses it is known that between 1985 and 1993 only in two such cases 
liability of plaintiffs on violation of antitrust law was proved.7 
Patent misuse doctrine is based on principles of obligation of patent holder to act in good faith and 
protection of public interest. Patent misuse term, by the way, could include a violation of antitrust terms 
by a patent holder. Also patent misuse occurs when a holder of patent rights tries to extend exclusive 
rights beyond those guaranteed by the patent. Reflection of patent misuse doctrine found itself in 35 
U.S.C. § 271 by enactment of the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988.8 
Specific limitation regarding abuse of IP rights was adopted by Chinese legislators too in Anti-
Monopoly Law which came into effect on 1 of August, 2008. Article 55 of the Act states that the Law is 
not applicable to the undertakings which use Intellectual Property Rights according to the laws and 
administrative regulations relevant to intellectual property, but is applicable to the undertakings which 
abuse IP and eliminate or restrict market competition. However, commentators said that such Article 
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needs further clarification because it could be construed too wide and effective application of it will be 
impossible.9 
Understanding that endless patent disputes could block innovation and trade on market at all, a 
measure was found – standardization. At first stage it was really productive tool. Due to activity of 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) standards in different fields were adopted. Every entity involved 
in specific technology area may join to standard by allowing other members of standard to license its 
patents related to specific technology defined as “essential patents” on Fair, Reasonable and Non-
Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Such cross-license activities made it possible to develop products using 
unified solutions, so the consumers may exploit same networks, use content of the same format and so on. 
There are different SSOs around the world like Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 
the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) in the USA or European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in Europe. Another 
example of similar institution is patent pools which could be defined as consortia of patent owners that 
place patents into a pool and then, as a group, cross-license them.10 
With development of technology and rise of competition on a market defects of standardization 
system and FRAND terms unveiled. Participating in SSOs is voluntary and companies want to join them 
to avoid probable prosecution by regulators for anti-competitive behavior and to benefit from patents of 
other player on a market. Usually SSOs acts on a basis of policies which also defines what does the term 
“essential patent” mean for purposes of SSO and FRAND terms licensing. With the lapse of time 
practices of “ambushing” were discovered when a member of a standard avoid to contribute an essential 
patent to it and then brings a patent infringement suit against other members. Then long contentions arise, 
because in fact SSOs policy envisages that its members must act in good faith and effective leverages to 
prevent unfair behavior and punish the violator do not exist. Also there is unclarity in understanding the 
term FRAND and unified way to determine what does “Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” mean 
is still suspended in the air.11  
Aforementioned loopholes and uncertainties in balance of competition and patent laws led to practices 
which have impacted the market of consumer electronics recently. 
In the spring of 2011 Apple Inc. sued Samsung Electronics for patent infringement and started the 
series of court disputes against Korean manufacturer around the world. Suits filed by Apple concerned 
infringements and unfair competition by Samsung in regard with its smartphones and tabs. In total there 
were approximately 50 lawsuits claimed by Apple and Samsung against each other in 10 countries.12 
Patent war between two technology giants involved many aspects of patent law as well as competition 
law, for instance, Samsung tried to use its patents regarding to 3G standard and assumed to be essential 
patents and eventually became the subject of anti-competitive investigation by European Commission.13 
Also there were a series of mutual claims and counterclaims in the USA, Australia, Germany and other 
countries. Apple alleged Samsung in infringement of its interface patents, design patents and unfair 
competition. In Australia Apple was granted with the injunction which banned sales of Samsung tablet 
computer Galaxy 10.1 right on the Christmas Eve. This injunction was dismissed eventually by a higher 
court. 
Another notable case took place in Germany. In February of 2012 Munich court granted an injunction 
to Apple against Motorola prevented the last from selling Xoom tablets using “slide-to-unlock” feature. 
At the same time Manheim court made a decision in favor of Motorola and forced Apple to deactivate 
“push” e-mail system on its devices which allows users to be notified automatically when a new message 
is arrived.14 
In all mentioned cases there were “unwanted victims” of the patent war and they are consumers. 
When a court decides to grant an injunction and prevent an appearance of a product on a market it always 
concerns consumer who already knows that he want to buy specific product but cannot do this due to the 
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injunction. There is an interesting fact that Motorola and Apple used their “non-essential” patents to block 
sales of competitor’s product. And consider this it is possible to make a presumption that if a patent which 
covers only a small feature of a high technology product could lead to restriction of sale of a whole 
product then why does such patent is not defined as essential? 
It is assumed that courts must pay more attention to the intention of initiated patent dispute. Litigation 
must be a tool for protection of rights but must not be leverage for excluding competitors. So, all 
conditions of a prospective case must be considerable, even the date of filing a claim and if it will be 
ascertained that infringement concerns only an insufficient element of the product that is even not a key 
feature thereof, then injunction must not be granted. Legislation must give courts options to resolve a 
patent dispute with a benefit to public interest and consumer welfare. So, in cases of “slide-to-unlock” or 
“push” infringements award of reimbursement of damages or imposing the obligation to enter into 
licensing agreement look more reasonable. Legislators should also pay attention to such measure like 
“compulsory licensing” which is being used in copyright law. In any way, some conclusions from 
smartphone patent wars must be done, because when there are parties with not equal power in a litigation 
then usually a weaker side have to refuse from using a technology which became a subject of a dispute 
even before the decision was made or to change its business model (like in Vistaprint v Unitedprint 
case)15, so the patent litigation in and of itself could be an effective tool for influence on weaker 
competitors and increasing number of awarded injunctions only encourage patent holders to enforce their 
patents and seek injunctions to restrict rivals’ sales instead of focusing on quality and prices of own 
products. 
3. Patent aggregators as tools for hindering competition 
During recent years rise of activity of specific entities on the intellectual property market was noticed. 
Such entities do not involve in production of goods or development of technology instead they 
accumulate patents and patent applications for different purposes. Because of the nature of their activity 
they could be identified as the special kind of non-practicing entities (NPE). Generally the term NPE 
includes universities and research firms as well but, as was mentioned, entities which will be described 
herein rarely provide other activities except accumulation of patents and applications and their 
enforcement or licensing, that is why they are one of the kind. 
Depending on purposes, such kind of NPEs could be divided on two groups. First includes individuals 
and small companies who acquire patents for further enforcement of them against players on different 
markets. They are often called “patent trolls”. Second group consists of patent holdings which include 
many subsidiaries and could be defined as patent aggregators. These aggregators by-turn could also be 
divided on three groups depending on purposes: “acquire, license, assign” aggregators; “acquire, license, 
accumulate” aggregators; and “acquire, develop, license and exploit” aggregators.16 
As was noticed a patent confers its owner the right to restrict others from exploitation of an invention. 
When hundreds and even thousands patents are accumulated by one entity serious concerns about 
protection of competition arise. But in case of aggregators actually they do not being in direct competition 
with manufacturers or services providers. On the other hand it is known that behind the largest 
aggregators stay famous market players and this is where potential threats to competition are. 
Of course, usually investors of patent aggregators are rivals to each other and participating in funding 
a patent aggregator must not be pledged as the anti-competitive act. Moreover patent aggregator model 
could be used as the effective defensive tool from aggressive patent trolls and in this case aggregators 
serve for consumers. But simultaneously a patent aggregator could be used as the watchdog to prevent 
newcomers from entering a market. In other words an aggregator may protect its members from new 
competitors by asserting existing patents against such competitors. And at the moment such activities will 
not be defined as anti-competitive behavior because it is almost impossible to prove that aggregator 
enforces its patent rights in favor of its investors and in addition to prevent arise of a new rival. 
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Also a patent aggregator may be an effective as intermediary in negotiations with other patent holders 
either NPEs or operating entities. For example, an aggregator may get a license from a patent troll or a 
partner of member(s) of such aggregator and then sub-license it to interested members. There is an 
assumption that under specific conditions such act could be seen as horizontal collusion which is 
prosecuted under anti-competitive law. Such activity could be admitted as the attempt of competitor 
manufacturers to act collusive to influence on price setting by a supplier.17 
In addition a patent aggregator may serve as a proxy in patent litigation, when a member do not want 
to start a litigation on itself for different purposes even to not fall in sight of regulators. There was a case 
in Germany when NPE called IP Com sued Nokia for patent infringement. Earlier IP Com had acquired 
the patent portfolio regarding to GSM standard from Bosch. Bosch did not will to act against Nokia on its 
own to not be involved in a costly litigation process instead it used IP Com as a proxy.18 Such practices 
are very effective when rising costs of a rival is needed. Intent to enter in collusion with NPE to enforce 
patents to influence on a competitor business is unprovable and using a proxy also reduces own cost on 
litigation and even saves reputation in some cases. 
In December, 2008 Russian antivirus software developer Kaspersky Labs was sued by IPAT for 
patent infringement. Kaspersky Labs was one of 23 companies which were sued by IPAT. Later, 
Kaspersky Lab was approached by RPX (large US-based patent aggregator) with the proposal to enter 
into the membership of RPX for three years to be released from a lawsuit of IPAT. 22 companies 
mentioned in the complaint were released from it while 11 of them became members of RPX. In January, 
2011 Kaspersky Labs filed a claim to FBI where accused RPX of extortion, racketeering and wire fraud.19 
The claim was dismissed. 
The case with Kaspersky Labs shows how activity of aggregators may create barriers for newly 
arrived player on a market. Entering a patent aggregator means that a member must not assert its patents 
against other members and it could be useful for those members which may be potential infringers of 
patents hold by a newcomer. Furthermore after such newcomer became a member of an aggregator they 
may license its patent on lower rates. And this practice already impacts rights of a patent holder because 
he has to join a patent aggregator and grant its members with licenses under conditions set out by an 
aggregator in exchange to be released from a lawsuit. And due to size of an aggregator as the rule it will 
always have enough patents to use against target. 
In fact it is very hard to prove presence of anti-competitive behavior in relations between aggregators 
and their members. It is almost impossible to charge aggregators for anti-competitive conducts because, 
as was already said, firstly, they are not in competition with targets, and secondly they have very complex 
structure with lot of shell-companies which actually act as initiators of litigation. At this time even unfair 
activity of aggregators is lying outside of anti-competitive law scope and when effective measures to 
resist aggressive aggregators will be found by legislators, patent aggregators will have a step further to 
adapt their practice for new rules. 
4. Accumulation and acquisitions of patent portfolios 
Another practice resembles activity of patent aggregators but must be distinguished from it because it 
relates to collecting patents by operating company. Usually manufacturers and services providers 
accumulate patents either for their implementing in own business or for defensive purposes. It is unlikely 
that operating entity acquire patents to force others to get into licensing agreements. Although 
accumulation and acquisitions of patent portfolios must not be recognized as an act of anti-competitive 
behavior, depending on objectives of a holder such practices may impact competition one way or another, 
and even collecting patents to create defensive pool might have ambush threats to market. 
The term accumulation in this section is defined as obtaining patents for own inventions of a company 
while the acquisition of patents relates to purchasing patents from other entities. Concerns about 
competition restriction may arise when an entity combines both of mentioned activities and creates large 
patent portfolios covering certain technologies. 
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In the summer of 2011 number of activated devices using Android as the operating system reached 
more than 500 thousand units per day.20 Android which belongs to Google became a serious rival to other 
mobile platforms like Apple’s iOS, Microsoft’s Windows Phone and RIM’s BlackBerry OS. Also 
Google’s operating system is being distributed as an open source software and could be used by different 
manufacturers, as the result number of Android devices may increase constantly that may lead to market 
price reduction. Google’s Chief Legal Officer David Drummond assumed that such state of things did not 
satisfy competitors (especially Apple and Microsoft) so they decided to join forces under two groups 
CPTN and Rockstar to acquire patent portfolios pertaining to telecommunications technologies of Novell 
and Nortel. On completion of such acquisitions new patent holders asserted their portfolios against 
Android devices manufacturers demanding 15$ of license fees from each produced device. Drummond 
summarized that it was the attempt to make a price of Android devices higher than a price of Windows 
Phone devices.21 
Group’s purchase of Novell’s and Nortel’s patents was noticed by regulators. The Department Of 
Justice of the United States set out a number of requirements CPTN must complied with. In particular 
Microsoft had to sell back Novell patents and operate only a license, and all acquired patents had to be 
available for open source licensing.22 
Google, by-turn, made the step in response to Apple’s and Microsoft’s actions and purchased 
Motorola Mobility with its patent collection including about 17,000 patents and applications. Although 
both US and European regulators approved Motorola’s acquisition there are some concerns which might 
become threats. Google possesses rights on Android OS and together with Motorola patents now Google 
has strong leverage on Android devices manufacturers to force last to adapt their products for Google’s 
services and if not Google could try to enforce its patents against them. However Google states that it 
takes another position and acquired patents will be used only for defensive purposes. But the defense 
might be different. 
Interesting way of how acquired patents may be used was demonstrated in the recent Yahoo v 
Facebook case. In March of 2012 Yahoo sued Facebook accusing the last of infringement of 10 Yahoo’s 
patents related to advertising, privacy, customization and social media technologies.23 Facebook 
responded with the counterclaim where alleged that Yahoo infringed 10 patents, 8 of which were acquired 
from other entities. Commentators assumed that situation with two lawsuits may lead to a stalemate in 
resolving the dispute and in that case Facebook could not bear royalty fees or refrain from operating 
several their services.24 Yahoo v Facebook case showed that defense in today’s patent litigation with 
usage of possibilities to operate large patent portfolio with acquired patents may exempt a defendant from 
disbursements on licensing. Moreover, a defendant with a larger portfolio may settle a case on his own 
conditions and force a plaintiff to give up his positions. Such practice is particularly dangerous for small 
entities. If a small company sues a larger competitor for infringement a defendant may counterclaim 
asserting own or acquired patents. At the moment the level of technology is very developed so it is not a 
problem for a big entity to find patents that could be used against a small plaintiff, especially in the IT 
area. 
In today’s world presence of a large patent portfolio is akin to nuclear arsenal of a country. It is 
unlikely that the nuclear weapon will be used in a conflict but when it exists it gives additional leverages 
to a country to influence on a policy in a region or even in the world. The same thing with patent 
portfolios, its holders may not use them against others but they could act more confidently on a market 
and may not pay attention to IP rights of smaller rivals and if a dispute occurs they will have a possibility 
to lead its resolving to deadlock or to settle it with benefit to them. 
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5. Conclusion 
Collisions of patent law and anti-competitive law still remain one of the most important issues of all legal 
systems. The key here lies in balance of rights granted by patent law and limitations imposed by anti-
competitive law. And that is why it is extremely hard for authorities to resolve this issue fairly and 
without prejudice to rights of market players. Bias in favor of either patent system or anti-competitive 
system may cause unpredictable consequences. Unfortunately our world is not ideal and some patent 
holders knowing about delicate border between exploitation of their intellectual property rights and 
violation of anti-competitive law try to use defects of legal systems to create artificial barriers for 
competitors and as a result to gain advantage on a market. 
In response to unfair practices by patent holders there were two methods on resisting such practices 
created. An entity targeted by aggressive patent holder may either file an antitrust claim or patent misuse 
claim. However both claims difficult to pursue so they could be effective only in cases where abusive 
behavior of patent holder is obvious. Moreover, patent misuse doctrine is applicable only in the US legal 
system. 
To minimize number of patent disputes which could impact consumer welfare standards in different 
technology fields were adopted. Standards allow manufacturers to cross-license their essential patents on 
Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. Although the incentive was positive in many 
ways several defects make it ineffective sometimes. The main problem lies in determining what the 
definition “Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory” means. In other words how to determine the border 
where terms become “unfair”, “unreasonable” and “discriminatory”? Soon after Google had announced 
about the acquisition of Motorola Mobility with its patent portfolio it sent a letter to IEEE where stated 
that Google will fulfill obligations of Motorola Mobility related to licensing on FRAND terms. In that 
letter Google also stated that maximum per-unit royalty rate will be 2.25% of the net selling price for the 
relevant end product. On 22 of February, 2012 Microsoft filed a competition complaint with European 
Union competition regulator where indicated that Google’s rate is not reasonable in relation to FRAND 
definition. Microsoft set forth that products may include several technologies covered by patents and 
when every patent will be licensed on 2.25% per unit rate then royalties paid by licensee will close to 
selling price of a product. Raymond Millien concluded that if Google’s rate is considered as 2.25% per 
unit regardless of the number of patents implicated then royalties only from a single licensee like Apple 
or Microsoft may excess the sum paid by Google for Motorola Mobility acquisition.25 
Recent practices of using patents to create problems for competitors are dangerous because it is 
difficult to detect them and recognize them as anti-competitive. Entities use them out of the scope of 
competition law but under cover of patent law. Such practices may relate to initiating patent infringement 
cases to seek an injunction to prevent entering a market by competitors’ products or simply to force 
competitor to change its product or business model if it does not wish to bear litigation costs; participating 
in a patent aggregator to sue competitors which are not members of aggregator or to force them become 
the member to license their patents on lower royalty rates; collecting patent portfolios to cover specific 
technology as most as possible and then license patents to competitors to raise prices on their products or 
to assert patents in a patent dispute to slow its resolving. 
Effective measures to react on mentioned practices do not exist at the moment. It is assumed that 
statutory limitations on preventing unfair patent activities are not required because: (1) they may 
unreasonably limit number of patent rights so patents lose their value; (2) it is difficult to presume all 
probable anti-competitive practices and when appropriate limitations come into effect patent holders 
could try to avoid them by implementing other unfair activities. Enactment of statutory provisions that 
prohibit abusive patent usage is pointless without strict borders of rights and obligations incurred from a 
patent. At the same time courts and state regulators must pay more attention to problems of balance 
between patent law and competition law and perform deeper investigation of every certain case where a 
risk of anti-competitive practice of patent asserting occurrence is high. In addition state bodies have to 
encourage activity of SSOs and take into account existing problems with determination of FRAND terms.  
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